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ARTICLE 
How Informed is Sovereign Consent to 
Investor-State Arbitration? 
DAVID N. CINOTTI
†
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Argentina’s recent history of international investment disputes 
highlights the role of sovereign consent in investor-State dispute 
resolution.  Argentina has been a frequent party to both litigation in 
the United States and international investment arbitration based on its 
consent to dispute-resolution provisions in bond agreements and 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  Argentina’s consent to these 
methods of dispute resolution is often invoked in response to 
complaints about the treatment of Argentina in both fora.  In other 
words, the fact that Argentina freely consented to these fora and the 
applicable law selected in the contracts and treaties is a strong 
argument for the legitimacy of the processes and resulting awards and 
judgments. 
This article addresses the distinctions between sovereign consent 
to litigation in national courts and sovereign consent to BITs, 
especially early or first-generation BITs like those at issue in the 
arbitrations against Argentina.  While consent may be a strong 
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(ICSID).  He is a graduate of Georgetown University Law Center and the College 
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argument for the legitimacy of the U.S. judgments against Argentina, 
consent has less force in the context of BIT arbitration because 
sovereigns like Argentina had much less information about the 
procedural and substantive realities of BIT arbitration before they 
entered into the treaties. 
Generally speaking, a sovereign that subjects itself to the 
jurisdiction of national courts applying national law in a contract 
setting puts itself in the position of a commercial actor and private 
party.  It has the opportunity, before doing so, to understand the 
national law that will be applied to, among other things, the 
counterparty’s substantive rights, limits on the sovereign’s ability to 
change the contract, and remedies for breach.  With regard to New 
York contract law and U.S. federal procedural law (the applicable 
law in the U.S. cases against Argentina), contracting sovereigns have 
comparative advantages in seeking pre-consent information.  The 
New York state and U.S. federal common-law systems are built on 
written decisions and binding precedent.  And the substantive and 
procedural law in New York state and the Second Circuit is 
particularly well-developed, as it is not difficult to find binding 
decisions of appellate courts in those jurisdictions on a range of 
issues that would be relevant to understanding contractual rights and 
remedies.  Moreover, a sovereign agreeing to national-court litigation 
to resolve contractual disputes can reasonably foresee, at the time of 
contracting, the types of disputes that might arise, and therefore better 
inform itself of the relevant law. 
Of course, the legitimacy of a decision and its correctness are 
different things.  One can still take issue with the latter while 
accepting the former.  Whether or not one believes the U.S. federal 
courts correctly decided the bondholders’ claims against Argentina, it 
is hard to argue that Argentina did not give informed consent to 
resolving disputes regarding its bond obligations in U.S. courts under 
U.S. law, and, that the process and resulting judgments were 
therefore legitimate.1 
In contrast, sovereigns that agree to international arbitration in 
investment treaties issue standing offers to nationals of the other 
contracting States without the same information that might be 
obtained before consenting to national-court jurisdiction as part of a 
bond offering.  This information deficit is especially pronounced with 
regard to first-generation BITs.  Sovereigns like Argentina that 
 
 1. See infra Parts II, IV. 
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entered into BITs in the 1990s did so many years before the bulk of 
the claims against those States arose.  In addition, the jurisdictional 
and substantive provisions of most BITs are vague and opened-ended 
and, in most cases, not easily understood with reference to decisional 
or other sources of law.2  For example, while Argentina might have 
consulted, pre-contract, a New York lawyer to explain with relative 
certainty the potential remedies against it for failure to make payment 
under a bond indenture—and the risk of an adverse ruling under the 
pari passu clause—Argentina would have had far less ability to 
understand with any certainty, pre-treaty, what constitutes an 
“investment” and what conduct breaches a guarantee of “fair and 
equitable treatment” under a BIT.  And, unlike the decisions of New 
York and U.S. federal courts, arbitral tribunals are not bound by prior 
decisions and are not based on a long history of public decisions 
subject to appellate review.3 
In short, sovereign States’ consent to early BITs may not have 
been all that informed, calling into question consent as an argument 
for the legitimacy of investor-State awards. 
II. A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE CLAIMS AGAINST ARGENTINA 
A thorough summary of the many claims against Argentina 
relating to measures it has taken in response to its economic crises is 
beyond the scope of this Article and, in any event, unnecessary here.  
A brief background serves solely to put in context the discussion that 
follows. 
From 1991 through 2001, Argentina issued more than $186.7 
billion in bonds.4  The bonds at issue in the U.S. cases against 
Argentina had maturity dates ranging from 2005 through 2031.5  The 
bond documents included a pari passu clause, which stated: 
The Securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, 
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the 
Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu without 
any preference among themselves.  The payment 
 
 2. Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN L. J. 1083, 1103 (2011). 
 3. Id. at 1094. 
 4. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 50 (Aug. 4, 2011). 
 5. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
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obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall 
at all times rank at least equally with all its other 
present and future unsecured and unsubordinated 
External Indebtedness . . . .6 
The bond agreements are governed by New York law, contain a 
New York forum-selection clause, and include a waiver of sovereign 
immunity.7  The bonds were transferrable and were accordingly 
purchased and sold on the secondary market.8  The bond agreements 
did not contain a collective-action clause, which would have 
permitted Argentina to amend the terms of the bonds if a sufficient 
number of bondholders agreed.9 
Argentina experienced a severe economic crisis from 
approximately 1998 through 2002, which led Argentina to default on 
its foreign debt in December 2001 and caused Argentina to 
implement a series of emergency measures, including abandoning its 
convertibility regime, which had pegged the Argentine peso to the 
U.S. dollar.10  These measures led foreign investors to commence 
numerous arbitrations against Argentina under BITs.11  Claimants 
have asserted, among other things, that their rights under Argentina’s 
bonds were deprived in violation of BIT protections of fair and 
equitable treatment, full protection and security, adequate 
compensation following expropriation, and other treaty standards.12  
Claimants have also alleged that Argentina’s emergency measures 
harmed investments in energy, water, electricity, and other sectors in 
 
 6. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 7. Id. at 253–54, 263. 
 8. Id. at 251. 
 9. Id. at 253. 
 10. Id. at 250–51; INT’L MONETARY FUND, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE, 
THE IMF AND ARGENTINA, 1991-2001, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.ieo-
imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/07292004report.pdf. 
 11. According to the website of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), Argentina has been a respondent in 51 arbitrations 
conducted at ICSID, many of which were suspended (likely due to settlement) 
before reaching a reported decision or award. INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/ 
AdvancedSearch.aspx?rntly=ST4 (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). By the author’s own 
count, approximately 20 of the ICSID cases against Argentina concern measures 
taken as a result of the 1998-2002 crisis. See id. 
 12. Alemanni v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 31, 33–35 (Nov. 17, 2014); Abaclat v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
¶¶ 238–39 (Aug. 4, 2011); Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, ¶¶ 41–42 (Aug. 22, 2012). 
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violation of various BIT provisions.13 
With regard to its external debt, Argentina offered exchange 
bonds in 2005 and 2010.14  Under the terms of these restructurings, 
bondholders exchanged their defaulted bonds for new bonds at a rate 
of 25 to 29 cents on the dollar.15  Argentina restructured more than 
90% of its foreign debt through these bond exchanges.16  Argentina 
made payments on the exchange bonds, but, did not do so on the 
bonds on which it defaulted in 2001.17  From 2009 through 2011, so-
called “holdout” bondholders, who did not accept the bond 
restructurings, sued Argentina in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York for breach of contract.18  The district 
court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit both held 
that Argentina violated the pari passu clause of the bond agreements 
when it paid the exchange bondholders but not the holdouts.19  The 
district court enjoined Argentina from making payments to the 
exchange bondholders if it did not make proportional payments to the 
holdout bondholders; the Second Circuit upheld this injunction.20  
Rather than comply with the injunction, Argentina defaulted on the 
exchange bonds in July 2014.21 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVEREIGN CONSENT 
Argentina was subject to suit in U.S. courts by bondholders and 
before arbitral tribunals by foreign investors based on its consent to 
those fora.  Like many sovereigns, Argentina chose to subject itself to 
 
 13. See EDF Int’l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, 
Award, ¶¶ 141–69, 199–202 (June 11, 2012) (discussing Argentina’s emergency 
measures and injury to a claimant’s investments generally); Total S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 25–29 (Dec. 27, 
2010) (discussing harm to investments in Argentine energy industries); El Paso 
Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 25–33 (Apr. 27, 2006) (same); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 68–73 (May 12, 2005) 
(same). 
 14. NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 251. 
 15. Id. at 252. 
 16. Id. at 253. 
 17. Id. at 251, 253. 
 18. Id. at 253. 
 19. Id. at 259–60. 
 20. Id. at 261–63. 
 21. See Nicole Hong et al., Argentine Debt Feud Finds Much Fault, Few Fixes, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/argentina-mulls-legal-
options-in-debt-dispute-1406814851 (discussing Argentina’s decision to default 
after the U.S. district court’s ruling rather than come to an agreement with holdout 
investors). 
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suit in exchange for the financial benefits of access to the 
international bond markets and the perceived benefits of foreign 
direct investment.  But it is important not to overlook the 
fundamental and extraordinary nature of sovereign consent to 
international dispute resolution.  Sovereign consent to resolving 
disputes before an international forum or a foreign State’s courts are 
an exception to principles of State sovereignty and sovereign 
immunity.  As the Permanent Court of International Justice put it, 
“[i]t is well established in international law that no State can, without 
its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes . . . either to 
mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific 
settlement.”22  Moreover, the first principle of international arbitration 
is that it is a consensual means of binding dispute resolution.23  And 
so the legitimacy of the process and resulting award in arbitration is 
always based in large measure on the consent of the parties.24  
Without party consent, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to resolve the 
dispute. 
In his dissenting opinion in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of 
Argentina,25 Chief Justice John G. Roberts cogently explained the 
importance of sovereign consent to international dispute resolution: 
It is no trifling matter for a sovereign nation to subject 
itself to suit by private parties; we do not presume that 
any country—including our own—takes that step 
 
 22. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 
27 (July 23). 
 23. See, e.g., Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010) (“[T]he 
first principle that underscores all of our arbitration decisions: Arbitration is strictly 
‘a matter of consent.’” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))); Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. 
Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5, Award, ¶ 291 (Aug. 17, 2012) 
(“It is not a disputed point that the consent of the parties is the fundamental basis of 
arbitration.”); George A. Bermann, Arbitration Fundamental: Arbitrability 
Trouble, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 367, 370 (2012) (“Legal systems that fail 
adequately to ensure a party’s consent to arbitration before compelling it to 
arbitrate run a very real risk of compromising arbitration’s very legitimacy as a 
mode of alternative dispute resolution.”). 
 24. See CDC Group PLC v. Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/14, Decision on Application for Annulment, ¶ 40 (June 29, 2005) (“[A] 
Tribunal’s legitimate exercise of power is tied to the consent of the parties . . . .”); 
Nienke Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 TEMP. L. 
REV. 61, 65 (2013) (“State consent is one traditional approach to normative 
legitimacy. The idea is that international institutions, including international 
adjudicative bodies, derive legitimacy from the consent of states to their 
jurisdiction.  The state consent approach legitimates authority by focusing on its 
sources or origins.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 25. 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014). 
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lightly.  But even where a sovereign nation has 
subjected itself to suit in its own courts, it is quite 
another thing for it to subject itself to international 
arbitration.  Indeed, “[g]ranting a private party the 
right to bring an action against a sovereign state in an 
international tribunal regarding an investment dispute 
is a revolutionary innovation” whose “uniqueness and 
power should not be over-looked.”  That is so because 
of both the procedure and substance of investor-state 
arbitration.26 
As Chief Justice Roberts noted, sovereign consent to suit in any 
forum must be appreciated as exceptional in that is a voluntary 
relinquishment of sovereign immunity.  In the context of investor-
State arbitration, consent to suit is even more notable, both from the 
perspective of the international system and of States themselves.  
Investor-State arbitration is an alternative to litigation in the host 
State’s courts, with its attendant biases (actual or perceived), which 
might deter foreign direct investment.  It is also an alternative to 
physical force or gun-boat diplomacy.27  So the fact that a sovereign 
has consented to an international forum for the resolution of disputes 
is of obvious importance to the international legal system.  It is also 
quite important from sovereigns’ perspectives when one considers the 
types of disputes that have been brought before investor-State 
tribunals.  The next section addresses some of the reasons that 
consent to investor-State arbitration is different than sovereign 
consent to other means of dispute resolution. 
IV. WHAT MAKES INVESTMENT-TREATY ARBITRATION DIFFERENT 
Chief Justice Roberts aptly stated that the “procedure and 
substance of investor-state arbitration” make sovereign consent to 
investment arbitration different than consent to other forms of dispute 
resolution, including litigation in a foreign State’s courts.28  These 
features make it particularly difficult for sovereigns to have 
predicted, before ratifying BITs, what treaty arbitration had in store 
for them.  In other words, States’ consent to first-generation BITs 
 
 26. Id. at 1219–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) 
(quoting JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 137 (2010)). 
 27. See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 29 (2010) (“Between 1820 and 1914, 
Great Britain used military force at least forty times in Latin America to protect its 
subjects and their property.”). 
 28. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1220 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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was not as fully informed as it might have been with regard to 
litigating or arbitrating in a different forum under a developed 
national law, such as Argentina’s consent to litigating disputes with 
bondholders in New York under New York law. 
First, as Chief Justice Roberts also noted, “[s]ubstantively, by 
acquiescing to arbitration, a state permits private adjudicators to 
review its public policies and effectively annul the authoritative acts 
of its legislature, executive, and judiciary.”29  The cases therefore 
have implications for the respondent States’ domestic regulatory 
authority and treasury.  The cases against Argentina are a good 
illustration of this reality. 
For example, several tribunals have considered whether 
measures taken in response to the Argentine fiscal crisis were 
justified by the defense of necessity.30  These tribunals have judged 
whether Argentina was excused from compliance with treaty 
obligations to foreign investors on account of the severity of the 
financial crisis it experienced.  The tribunals reached different results, 
but the fact that they evaluated such an issue is itself a substantial 
limit on sovereign authority because the cases subjected Argentina to 
judgment and potential liability for its public policies in a time of 
crisis.  In Suez v. Argentina, the tribunal rejected the necessity 
defense and stated, “The severity of a crisis, no matter the degree, is 
not sufficient to allow a plea of necessity to relieve a state of its treaty 
obligations.”31  In Sempra Energy v. Argentina, the tribunal reasoned 
that whether necessity was a defense depended on “whether the 
constitutional order and the survival of the State were imperiled by 
the crisis”; the tribunal concluded that Argentina’s “constitutional 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 257–65 (July 30, 
2010) (finding that Argentina’s actions leading up to its financial crisis precluded 
the defense of necessity under customary international law); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 160–236 (Sept. 5, 
2008) (finding that Argentina’s conduct conformed with the conditions of the 
necessity provision in Art. XI of the BIT); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 332–55 (Sept. 28, 2007) 
(concluding that Argentina failed to meet the requirements for the defense of 
necessity under customary international law); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 315–94 (May 12, 
2005) (holding that regardless of whether Argentina’s wrongful actions were 
justified or temporarily suspended under Art. XI of the BIT, the State nonetheless 
was under a duty to compensate the investor for “the right which had to be 
sacrificed” during the crisis). 
 31. Suez, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, ¶ 258. 
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order was not on the verge of collapse” and that “[e]ven if emergency 
legislation became necessary in this context, legitimately acquired 
rights could still have been accommodated by means of temporary 
measures and renegotiation.”32  Thus, private arbitrators were called 
upon to evaluate the gravity of the threat to Argentina’s economic, 
political, and social order, and whether the measures it undertook 
were necessary and otherwise lawful under international law. 
Other cases against different sovereigns have subjected national 
environmental and health policies to challenge under BITs.  For 
example, Philip Morris brought arbitrations against Uruguay for 
requiring certain graphic images as part of warning labels on cigarette 
cartons and against Australia for requiring that cigarettes be sold in 
plain packaging with limited branding.33  Foreign investors have 
asserted claims relating to environmental and other regulations, 
including a claim against the United States arising from restrictions 
on mining activities near Native American sacred sites.34 
These are just a few examples of investment-treaty claims that 
have subjected States’ health, environmental, and economic measures 
to arbitrators’ review and judgment.  There is little evidence on the 
face of the BITs that States understood such measures could be 
challenged as violations of investment treaties.  Whether such claims 
are beneficial to the international legal system or for the development 
of foreign direct investment is a separate question.  But these kinds of 
cases—which might not have been predictable before States 
consented to early BITs—confirm that sovereign consent to investor-
State arbitration is “no trifling matter.”35 
Second, jurisdictional and substantive standards in BITs are 
broad and often ambiguous, and therefore do not provide much 
information, on their own, as to what conduct is a breach of treaty.  
 
 32. Sempra Energy, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 332. 
 33. Philip Morris Brands SÀRL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 5 (July 2, 2013); Philip Morris Asia Ltd. 
v. Commonwealth of Australia, Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, at ¶¶ 1.1–
1.2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0665.pdf. 
 34. See generally Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Arb. 
Trib. 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf (arbitrating 
a dispute between a Canadian mining company and the United States over an 
alleged breach of the North American Free Trade Agreement that arose when the 
United States and the State of California allegedly expropriated the company’s 
mining interests in a region of southern California). 
 35. BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1219 (2014) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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The jurisdictional requirement of an “investment” is one familiar 
example.  Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention limits ICSID 
jurisdiction to “any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national of another 
Contacting State.”36  BITs also ordinarily protect “investments” of 
foreign nationals.  But the ICSID Convention and BITs do not 
precisely define the term, and instead leave it broad and subject to 
much interpretation.  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development has noted: 
There is no single definition of what constitutes 
foreign investment.  International investment 
agreements usually define investment in very broad 
terms. They refer to “every kind of asset” followed by 
an illustrative but usually non-exhaustive list of assets, 
recognising that investment forms are constantly 
evolving. The ICSID Convention does not define the 
term investment.37 
Given the current uncertainty on the meaning of “investment,” it 
is reasonable to conclude that sovereigns entering into early BITs—
before a body of arbitral jurisprudence arose interpreting the term—
lacked a clear understanding of what might be considered an 
“investment” and would therefore be protected under the treaties. 
The Fair and Equitable Treatment (or FET) Clause in most BITs 
is equally troublesome.  There is a recurring debate about whether 
such clauses incorporate the minimum standard of treatment under 
customary international law, and what such a standard might be.38  If 
the FET standard does not incorporate principles of customary 
international law, and is therefore not governed by a “special 
meaning” under Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT), the phrase is not easily analyzed using its 
ordinary meaning in context or in light of the treaty’s “object and 
 
 36. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 25(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 
159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
 37. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INT’L INV. LAW: UNDERSTANDING 
CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS 9 (2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/40471468.pdf. 
 38. See, e.g., U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
TREATMENT: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INT’L INV. AGREEMENTS II, at 7–8, 
U.N. DOC. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.D.15 (2012), avail-
able at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf [hereinafter 
UNCTAD]. 
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purpose,” as required under VCLT Article 31(1).39  Noting tribunals’ 
struggle to give content to the FET standard, UNCTAD has 
recognized that: 
with regard to the capacious wording of most FET 
provisions, many tribunals have interpreted them 
broadly to include a variety of specific requirements 
including a State’s obligation to act consistently, 
transparently, reasonably, without ambiguity, 
arbitrariness or discrimination, in an evenhanded 
manner, to ensure due process in decision-making and 
respect investors’ legitimate expectations. This 
extensive list of disciplines can be taxing on any State, 
but especially developing and least-developed ones.40 
Such an approach to the FET Clause ventures very close to 
granting arbitrators the power to decide ex aequo et bono, which the 
ICSID Convention, like most arbitral rules, forbids without party 
consent.41 
Although one might say that domestic legal standards can be 
equally broad and non-self-defining, domestic legal systems do not 
ordinarily have the other features of investor-State arbitration that 
make imprecise codification problematic.  To be sure, the Due 
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution says little about what is or is 
not a constitutional violation, but the binding interpretations of U.S. 
courts fill the gap in ways that nonbinding, and sometimes 
conflicting, decisions of arbitral tribunals do not.  Again, the fact that, 
decades after first-generation BITs came into force, there is still 
widespread disagreement about the meaning and application of a 
fundamental protection in BITs suggests that sovereign consent at the 
time of ratification was not fully informed. 
Third, the system lacks binding precedent or an appellate body, 
and decisions can often conflict.  As Professor Susan D. Franck has 
stated, “[t]here is no coherent system for addressing inconsistencies 
across the investment treaty network and . . . there is no uniform 
mechanism to correct inconsistent decisions.”42  While the lack of 
 
 39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), (4), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 40. UNCTAD, supra note 39, at xiii. 
 41. See ICSID Convention, supra note 37, art. 42(3) (providing that the parties 
must consent for a tribunal to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono). 
 42. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 
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appellate review to harmonize the law is not unusual for arbitration, 
conflicting decisions in commercial arbitration pose little risk to the 
coherence or perceived legitimacy of the applicable legal systems.  A 
disagreement between two commercial arbitral tribunals applying 
New York law to the same contract language will have no impact on 
the coherence of New York law.  Even if the awards are made public 
(which happens with much less frequency in commercial arbitration 
than in investor-State arbitration), it is unlikely that the awards would 
be relied upon to determine rights and responsibilities ex ante; parties 
simply do not need the guidance of commercial arbitrators on the 
scope of New York law—they have written decisions backed by the 
common-law system of binding precedent for that.  But arbitral 
tribunals are the main “lawmakers” when it comes to interpreting 
investment treaties.  Two tribunals reaching opposing decisions on 
the same claim or treaty text has a much more significant systemic 
impact. 
And such divergent results do occur.  In the Lauder cases, for 
example, one tribunal found that the Czech Republic breached a 
variety of BIT provisions to the Dutch affiliate of a U.S. investor, 
while another tribunal rejected most of the claims and concluded that 
the Czech Republic committed a single, more limited violation 
against the U.S. investor.43  In another example, two companies that 
provided preshipment customs inspections services claimed that 
Paraguay violated various BIT provisions by persistently failing to 
pay bills for services rendered.44  The factual basis for the claims, the 
contracts between the State and the claimants, and the relevant BIT 
standards of treatment were the same or substantially the same.  In 
both cases, Paraguay argued that the claim was nothing more than a 
breach of contract, which was subject to a forum-selection clause in 
the contracts that made all claims relating to breach of contract within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Paraguayan courts.45  In SGS, the 
tribunal held that the forum-selection clause did not apply and that 
Paraguay breached the Umbrella Clause in the treaty (that is, the 
 
FORDHAM. L. REV. 1521, 1546 (2005). 
 43. See id. at 1559–68 (discussing the difference between the Stockholm and 
London Lauder arbitrations). 
 44. SGS Société Générale De Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 25–30 (Feb. 10, 2010); Bureau 
Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. Republic 
of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 7, 11–12 (May 29, 2009). 
 45. SGS, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 126; BIVAC, 
ARB/07/9, ¶¶ 130–31. 
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clause that called for Paraguay to guarantee the observance of its 
commitments towards foreign investments) by breaching the 
contract.46  In BIVAC, on the other hand, the tribunal held that a claim 
under the Umbrella Clause was inadmissible because BIVAC’s claim 
was based on a breach of contract, which was within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Paraguayan courts,47 and that BIVAC could not 
prove an FET violation for nonpayment when Paraguay had not used 
its sovereign power in any way to frustrate BIVAC’s contract rights, 
including its right to redress in the Paraguayan courts.48 
These cases—in which tribunals hearing essentially the same 
claim rendered inconsistent decisions without any means to reconcile 
them—is emblematic of the challenges that States face in 
determining what conduct violates a BIT. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that Argentina and other States have 
consented through their BITs to arbitrate a wide range of investment 
disputes, to an arbitral system without binding precedent or appellate 
review, and to ambiguous substantive and jurisdictional standards.  
One might argue that by agreeing to such provisions, States should 
not be heard to complain about the legitimacy of investor-State 
arbitration.  It is not the author’s position that investor-State 
arbitration is an inherently unfair or illegitimate means of dispute 
resolution.  But the nature of the claims subject to investment-treaty 
arbitration, coupled with certain aspects of the system, call into 
question the argument that States get what they legitimately expected 
or bargained for in investor-State arbitration, an argument that is 
more easily applied to other forms of sovereign dispute resolution. 
 
 
 46. SGS Société Générale De Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/29, Award, ¶¶ 72, 74–75, 101 (Feb. 10, 2012). 
 47. BIVAC, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, ¶¶ 148–49. 
 48. Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC 
B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Further Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 279–84 (Oct. 9, 2012). 
